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STATUS OF A CONTROVERSY: THE TAX COURT, THE COURTS
OF APPEALS, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental principles guiding the workings of the
judicial system in the United States is the assumption that a court in its
adjudications will follow a clearly applicable precedent established by its
reviewing court. Yet for many years one court, the United States Tax
Court, refused to be bound by that basic concept. The Tax Court took
the view that Congress, by giving the court nationwide jurisdiction, in-
tended it to decide all cases uniformly, regardless of where they may arise.,
Because the eleven courts of appeals review decisions of the Tax Court,2
the Tax Court believed that it could not fulfill its congressional mandate
if it were to decide one case one way and another differently merely be-
cause appeals in such cases might be taken to different courts of appeals.3
As a result, the Tax Court resolved to decide all cases on its own de-
termination of the law and the merits of the case,4 even if in so doing the
court found it necessary to disregard a holding, squarely in point, by the
court of appeals which was likely to review the case. The approach
spelled out in Lawrence persisted as part of the Tax Court's repertoire for
many years. However, in lack E. Golsen,5 decided April 9, 1970, the Tax
Court took a significant step toward abandoning the controversial Law-
rence doctrine.
From the outset, it was clear that the facts of the Golsen case would
not place a constraint upon the Tax Court to re-evaluate the Lawrence doc-
trine. The taxpayer in Golsen had purchased life insurance policies with
exceptionally high premiums and high cash values. The taxpayer then
borrowed the full cash value of the policies each year.6 Most of the funds
were added to a prepaid premium fund, maintained by the insurance com-
pany, from which petitioner's annual premium on the policies was paid.
The remaining funds were used to pay the interest on petitioner's indebt-
lArthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713,718 (1957). Lawrence was the principal case in which
the Tax Court articulated its policy of deciding cases uniformly.
2 Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 74 82(a) the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Tax Court. Venue is determined by the legal residence of the peti-
tioner, if he is an individual, or in the case of a corporation, by the location of its principal place
of business. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7482(b)(1). In addition the parties may, by stipula-
tion, appeal to any one of the courts of appeals. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7482(b)(2). If two
or more litigants are joined in a single case before the Tax Court, each litigant is free to direct an
appeal to the court of appeals in whose jurisdiction he resides.
a Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718 (1957).
4Id. at 716-17.
5 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
6 Id. at 752.
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edness, created by his borrowing of the full cash value of the policies.
Taxpayer sought to claim a deduction for income tax purposes of interest
on indebtedness." The Tax Court denied the deduction, holding that such
policies were "merely the equivalent of renewable term insurance, and that
actuarially the net cash which the insured in fact paid to the insurance
company, however described, merely represented the true cost of the in-
surance purchased."'
This very issue had already been adjudicated by two courts of appeals
with differing results.' 0 Appeal in Golsen lay to the court of appeals
which had accepted the view that the Tax Court was taking in Golsen.
The Tax Court did not have to consider the applicability of the Lawrence
doctrine, because the two courts were in harmony. Nonetheless, the Tax
Court chose Golsen as its vehicle for discarding the more controversial
aspects of that doctrine. The Golsen court said that whether or not the
Tax Court was in agreement with the reviewing court, it was bound by
that court of appeals prior holding on the issue.1 The Tax Court ac-
knowledged the contrary thrust of Lawrence, but said that "[b~etter judicial
administration requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is
squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Ap-
peals and to that court alone."'1
II. THE LAWRENCE DOCTRINE
When Lawrence was decided in 1957 it was the formalization of past
practice, rather than a departure from it.'3 Since its founding as the Board
of Tax Appeals in 1924, the Tax Court has wrestled with the difficulties
of administering what it believed to be a congressional mandate to use its
nationwide jurisdiction to foster uniform application of the federal tax
laws. 14 One of the more vexing problems in this context has been the
handling of an issue which comes before the Tax Court after a court of
appeals has reversed a prior Tax Court holding on the same point. In
Lawrence the Tax Court said that it would consider the higher court's rea-
soning. But if still convinced of the merits of its original result, the Tax
7 Id. at 745.8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 163.
0 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 753 (1970).
10 In Campbell v. Cen-Tex, Inc., 377 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1967) the taxpayer won, but in Gold-
man v. United States, 403 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1968) the government had prevailed.
" Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 756 (1970).
12 Id. at 757.
13 See Brooklyn Nat'l Corp., 5 T.C. 892, 895 (1945) and Joan Carol Corp., 13 T.C. 83, 85
(1949). In both these pre-Lawrence cases the Tax Court declined to follow an applicable prece-
dent of the reviewing court of appeals.
14Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718 (1957). Besides the grant of nationwide jurisdic-
tion, the fact that the Tax Court was long designated an agency of the executive branch and not
a constitutional court undoubtedly contributed to its sometimes reluctance to act like a court.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7441.
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Court would follow its initial holding until the Supreme Court decides the
point.1
The courts of appeals made clear their dislike for the Lawrence ap-
proach in two particular cases, one decided shortly before and the other
immediately after Lawrence.16  In Stacey Manufacturing v. Commission-
er, 7 the sixth circuit gave its "considered opinion" that the Tax Court is
not lawfully privileged to refuse to follow, as the settled law of the cir-
cuit, an opinion by the court of appeals of that circuit.' The seventh cir-
cuit was equally harsh in stating that the Tax Court's overruling of a de-
cision of the court of appeals "is not consonant with the responsibilities
of the respective tribunals involved."'" The latter case was heard by the
Supreme Court20 which affirmed the decision of the court of appeals with-
out reference to the conflict between its subordinate courts.
Editorial reaction to Lawrence was generally critical.21 There was con-
siderable questioning of the efficacy of the Tax Court's view of its policy
making role in the tax adjudication process. The court's primary function
was thought by the editorial writers to be the settlement of specific dis-
putes, not the setting of broad policy.2 2 The futility of the court's effort
to secure uniformity was already evident from the fact that the Tax Court
heard only disputed determinations of a deficieny in the payment of taxes,
while jurisdiction over the refund of taxes already paid was vested in the
federal district courts and the court of claims.?3
The critics also generally rejected the Tax Court's technical justifica-
tions for the Lawrence approach. The principal problem, as the Tax
Court apparently saw it in Lawrence, was the question of venue. The
court said it couldn't be sure when it decides a case where any subsequent
appeal will go. The court usually knows where the return was filed and
hence where the appeal could go,24 but the parties by stipulation may ap-
peal to any of the courts of appeals.25 Moreover, it frequently happens
that a Tax Court decision is appealable to more than one court of appeals,
15 Id. at 716-17.
16 Lawrence was decided January 25, 1957. Lawrence was reversed on the merits of the case
by the ninth circuit which made no mention of the doctrine for which Lawrence became best
known. 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
17237 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1956).
18 Id. at 606.
19 Sullivan v. Comm'r, 241 F.2d 46,47 (7th Cir. 1957).
20 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
21 Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Court of Appeals Precedents,
57 CoLum. L. REV. 717 (1957). Orkin, Finality of the Court of Appeals Decisions in the Tax
Court: A Dichotomy of Opinion, 43 A.B.AJ. 945 (1957). 70 HARv. L. REv. 1313 (1957). 7
DUKE L. J. 45 (1957).
22 Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy, supra n. 21, at 721.
23rd. at 722. Orkin, supra n. 21, at 946.
24 Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718 (1957).
25 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7482(b)(2).
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because multiple parties are involved. In Lawrence the court uses the ex-
ample of an action involving corporate stockholders who are scattered
throughout the United States.26 It also offered the examples of partners
who live in different circuits and of the taxpayer who has filed returns for
different years in different circuits.2
The court's concern regarding the possibility of a change of venue by
stipulation was unwarranted, because it appears certain that both parties
will not agree to take an appeal outside a circuit in which the court of
appeals has already made clear its support of the position of one of them.
The problem raised when the case is appealable to two or more circuits
is immensely more difficult. It has been argued that even if the problem
was decisive in those cases where it does exist, it should not be used to
justify, as a general proposition, rejection of applicable appellate court
precedents.2 8  Beyond that, however, it has been contended that the Tax
Court can solve the problem merely by acknowledging that it need not
apply the same law to all litigants before it.2 To follow blindly this ap-
proach, however, could put the Tax Court in an uncomfortable position.
In the case of a corporate distribution, for example, the court might have
to direct some shareholders to pay tax on the distribution, while relieving
others of any liability to pay tax on the same transaction, solely because
they reside in different circuits. It can be done, but to do so would put
the judges of the Tax Court in the position of having accepted both sides
of an issue in order to further the mechanical application of normal judi-
cial procedure. Other federal courts and state courts can apply precedent
to all litigants before them without being placed in a similar situation.30
Besides its effect on the judges of the Tax Court, such an approach is
likely to lessen respect for the Tax Court by a taxpayer who loses his case
in such circumstances.
The Lawrence approach was also criticized because it brought the fi-
nancial position of the taxpayer into play.3' If one could afford to pay
the deficiency, he could then seek a refund in the district court which was
certain to follow the rule in its circuit. On the other hand, one who took
the same case to the Tax Court could be forced, by the court's refusal to
follow applicable precedent, to pursue a costly and time-consuming appeal
to reach the same ultimate result.
The impact of the Lawrence doctrine on the Tax Court's disposition of
2 6 Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718-19 (1957).
27 Id. at 719.
28 Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy, supra n. 21, at 721.
29 Id.
30 These courts fall into the traditional pyramidal system of review and need only look to a
single higher court for precedent. The system for review of Tax Court decisions constitutes an
inverted pyramid; the Tax Court must look to all eleven courts of appeal for applicable prece-
dent.
31 Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy, supra n. 21, at 722. 7 DUKE L J. 45, 49 (1957).
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post-Lawrence cases is difficult to determine. In the 1950's the court ex-
pressly declined to follow a court of appeals precedent in several cases and
in so doing cited Lawrence.3 2  In the 1960's the doctrine was rarely in-
voked by name. Whether it was applied subtly, by distinguishing cases,
for example, is hard to ascertain. In Golsen the court stated that during
the thirteen years since Lawrence was decided the Tax Court had never
deemed it appropriate to re-evaluate the Lawrence doctrine.33 Actually, a
minority of the Tax Court did consider the issue in 1968. Five judges in
a concurring opinion34 voiced their disagreement with the majority view
but said that to hold otherwise would be impractical inasmuch as the court
of appeals which was likely to review the case had held as the majority
now holds. In this way, they expressly stated their unwillingness to follow
Lawrence.
The foregoing discussion suggests a fairly vigorous application of the
Lawrence doctrine in the late 1950's, subtle application or disinterest in
the early and mid-1960's, growing hostility toward it in the late 1960's,
culminating in partial abandonment of the doctrine in 1970.
III. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES
Golsen has clearly limited the use of a policy under which the Tax
Court has openly defied the authority of its reviewing courts. Consequent-
ly, the Lawrence doctrine will no longer be used to support a refusal to
apply precedent, when an appeal from the Tax Court can go to only one
court of appeals and that court has established a clearly applicable prece-
dent. The language of Golsen suggests, however, that the court may not
intend to abandon the doctrine completely; at least the court did not ex-
pressly state such an intent.
In Golsen the court stated that it would follow a court of appeals
precedent which is "squarely in point," where appeal from the court's de-
cision is directed to that court of appeals and "to that court alone." 35 The
phrase "squarely in point"" might mean that the Tax Court will decline to
follow a court of appeals precedent if the cases involved are distinguish-
able, even slightly, on their facts, or if the Tax Court is unsure about the
exact rule of law that has been laid down by the reviewing court. The
phrase "and that court alone"37 could indicate that the Tax Court will ad-
here to precedent only when dealing with a single litigant or with multiple
32 Mary Stoumen, 27 T.C. 1014, 1021 (1957). Estate of Loeb, 29 T.C. 22, 28 (1957).
Charles M. Kilborn, 29 T.C. 102, 110 (1957). Estate of Baker, 30 T.C. 776, 779 (1958).
Genevra Heman, 32 T.C. 479, 490 (1959).
3 3Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757, n.14 (1970).
34 Norvel Jeff McLellan, 51 T.C. 462,467 (1968).
35 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
361 d.
37 Id.
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litigants whose appeals are limited to the precedent-setting court of ap-
peals. This limitation leaves open the question of the applicability of the
Lawrence doctrine in cases involving multiple litigants, where appeal to
two or more courts of appeals is possible. In such circumstances the Tax
Court could separate the litigants and use precedent as it applies to each
litigant. The court could, alternatively, apply the Lawrence doctrine and
decide the case solely on the court's own determination of the law and the
merits of the case.
The partnership situation highlights the dilemma involved in applying
either approach. The partnership itself is not subject to the federal in-
come tax. Instead the persons carrying on a business as partners are liable
for the tax in their individual capacities."8 The following setting is illus.
trative. Partners, residing in different circuits, claim on their individual
tax returns a deduction which they allege is a business expense related to
the activities of the partnership. The Internal Revenue Service disallows
the deduction and assesses a deficiency. The partners acting in their in-
dividual capacities join in a petition before the Tax Court. The decision
of the court relates to a single transaction involving a single entity, the
partnership. The decision is appealable, however, to different courts of
appeals, because of the residences of the partners. Here logic is scorned,
if the court decides in favor of one partner because of an applicable prece-
dent by the court of appeals which will review his case, but against an-
other partner on the merits of the case in the absence of precedent. In
so doing, however, the Tax Court removes the necessity of an appeal by
the first partner to vindicate what are clearly his legal rights. If Lawrence
was followed and the case was decided for both partners solely on the
merits, the first partner would be forced to make a costly and time-con-
suming appeal to a court of appeals which has already accepted his posi-
tion. Golsen does not make clear what the court's formal approach will
be in such situations.
The Tax Court's opportunity for securing review by the Supreme Court
is not hampered by the Tax Court's acceptance of applicable court of ap-
peals precedent. Most tax cases reach the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari. A review on certiorari is discretionary and will be granted
"only where there are special and important reasons therefore."' 9 A show-
ing of conflict among the courts of appeals is likely to weigh heavily as a
factor favoring review. The contention that a court of appeals decided
wrongly is not in itself likely to be considered a "special and important"
reason for review. 40 For this reason, the kind of head-to-head confronta-
tion between the Tax Court and the reviewing court of appeals brought
38 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 701.
M) U.S. Sup. CT. 1M 19.
4 0 R. FIELD AND B. KAPLAN, CIVIL PROCEDUREt (temp. 2d ed. 1968), at 112.
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about by a strict application of the Lawrence doctrine does virtually noth-
ing to promote vindication of the Tax Court's position by the Supreme
Court.4 '
The court in Golsen pointed out that, even in the absence of the Law-
rence doctrine, the Tax Court is able to foster uniformity in the applica-
tion of the federal tax laws. The Tax Court can offer its views in cases
appealable to courts whose views on a particular issue have not been made
known. In the situation where the reviewing court of appeals has estab-
lished a precedent, the Tax Court can explain why it agrees or disagrees
with the precedent which it feels constrained to follow. 42
IV. THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES
The existence for many years of the Lawrence doctrine or its equivalent
reflects more than the views of a majority of the court at a given time.
The doctrine was a reaction, perhaps an inevitable one, to the unique posi-
tion that the Tax Court long held in the executive and judicial machinery.
Two factors were most crucial in this regard-the Tax Court's status as an
independent agency of the executive branch43 and the system for reviewing
Tax Court decisions which has eleven courts reviewing one. The difficul-
ties inherent in the court's position'as an executive agency were remedied
by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which gave the Tax Court status as a con-
stitutional court.4 The more difficult problems raised by the inverted
pyramid structure for review remain unsolved, however.
A. Recognizing the judicial Status of the Tax Court
The Lawrence decision with its emphasis on uniform application of the
federal tax laws gave support to the view that the Tax Court has at least
some role in promoting the tax policies of the executive branch. Golsen
by emphasizing proper judicial administration, stresses the Tax Court's
status as a court. Golsen was decided less than a year after the Tax
Court's status was changed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Thus, Golsen
may well reflect the action of Congress, even though the court in Golsen
makes no mention of this factor in its reasoning.
Attempts had been made previously to remove the Tax Court from the
executive branch. However, each time they failed, although opposition
41 The tax adjudication process already functions with a minimum of review by the Supreme
Court. In 1969, for example, the Supreme Court decided only six civil tax cases. Two of these
cases were heard initially by the Tax Court, three by district courts, and one by the Court of
Claims. 1969 ANN. REP. OF THE COMM'R OF INT. REV. 121, table 21.
42 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
4 3 1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7441.
44 Under § 951 of the 1969 Act, which amended § 7441 of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
the United States Tax Court was established as a court of record. Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. IX,
subtit. D (Dec. 30, 1969). Inherent in that change was the granting of authority previously
denied the Tax Court, such as the power to punish for contempt.
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to such proposals was not always substantial.45  In 1967 and 1968 a sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the proposal
that was ultimately adopted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.46 During
those hearings, the status of the Tax Court as an executive agency was
criticized on several grounds. It was said to violate the constitutional
separation of powers.47 The court's status meant that while the court's
functions were essentially judicial, it lacked essential judicial powers.48  In
addition many taxpayers were thought to view the Tax Court as an arm of
the Internal Revenue Service and to regard it as just the final step in the
administrative settlement of tax disputes." Most of those testifying
agreed that granting the Tax Court status as a constitutional court would
go a long way toward remedying these infirmities.
Opposition to the proposal was not substantial. The Department of
Justice was concerned that such a change at that time would prevent more
basic changes in the tax adjudication system. 0 The Department of the
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service were apprehensive about dis-
ruptions in their existing bureaucratic machinery."
The Lawrence doctrine itself found its way into the hearings during
the testimony of Sheldon Cohen, at that time the Commissioner of Internal
4 5 Opposition to one such proposal, offered to the House of Representatives in 1949, was ap-
parently based mainly on the fear that accountants would no longer be allowed to practice
before the Tax Court. Even at that time, however, lawyers constituted 98% of the practitioners
before the court. Gribbon, Should the Judicial Character of the Tax Court be Recognized, 24
GEo. WA sH. L. Riv. 619, 622 (1956). A similar proposal was introduced in the Senate in 1958,
but it too came to naught. Henke, The Tax Court, the Proposed Administrative Court, and Judi-
cialization, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 449,465 n.62 (1966).
4 6 Hearings on S.2041 Before the Subconm. on Improvements in judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1968). (hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings).
471d. at 15. This precise contention had already been the subject of litigation. In Martin
v. Comm'r, 358 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1966), it was held that the creation of the Tax Court as an ex-
ecutive agency was not an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to infringe on the functions of
the judicial branch. In Nash Miami Motors v. Comm'r, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1966) the court
ruled that the existence of the Tax Court did not constitute a violation of the separation of
powers. The very fact that the issue was brought before the courts, however, served to under-
score the uncertainty that existed about the status of the Tax Court
48 Hearings, supra n.46, at 15, 60.
-1 Id. at 15,61.
GO Id. at 44. This testimony was offered during the first session of the subcommittee's hear-
ings in October 1967. At the second session in July 1968 the Justice Department offered its
suggestions for a basic change in the present system of trying federal tax cases. The department
proposed that exclusive jurisdiction over civil tax cases be vested in one of the existing trial
courts-the Tax Court, the federal district courts, or the Court of Claims. Alternatively, it was
proposed that the three existing trial courts be given concurrent jurisdiction over claims for re-
fund and deficiency claims. Id. at 120-25. Whatever the merits of these proposals, they offered
no satisfactory reason for delaying recognition of the Tax Court's status as a constitutional court.
r" Id. at 78-9. The Treasury Department was concerned that representation of the Govern-
ment before the Tax Court would shift from the Internal Revenue Service to the Justice De-
partment. Although this could have happened if normal procedure was followed, many ex-
ceptions already existed, and the bill in question provided for continued representation by the
Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 79.
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Revenue. He took a view similar to that of the court in Lawrence. Cohen
stated,
... we believe that the Tax Court's approach in this respect is sound; it
is based on the desire for assuring a uniform result nationwide. As a
national court, the Tax Court should not be required to decide identical
cases differently because taxpayers happen to live in different circuits. 52
The subsequent adoption of the proposal by the Congress and the rea-
sons advanced during the hearings in support of it undercut the Cohen
position. There is no longer a basis in the words of Congress for inferring
that the Tax Court has a congressional mandate to promote the application
of the tax policy of the executive branch. The Congress was unambiguous
in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in declaring the Tax Court's status as a
court of record.53
B. A Court of Tax Appeals
A highly controversial proposal but one with the potential for con-
siderable impact on the existing procedure for review of Tax Court deci-
sions is the creation of a court of tax appeals. The creation of a single
court of review would eliminate the technical justifications for use of the
Lawrence doctrine, inasmuch as the Tax Court would no longer be faced
with the problems inherent in its effort to deal with the precedents of
eleven reviewing courts.
Proposals for the creation of a court of tax appeals are made periodi-
cally.54 They invariably draw heavy criticism 5 and have yet to win broad
support in the Congress. The most comprehensive outline of the structure
and functioning of a court of tax appeals was provided some twenty-five
years ago by Erwin Griswold, a former Dean of the Harvard Law School. 0
Griswold was concerned about the confusion and uncertainty that existed
during the lengthy period of time it took to get a tax question before the
Supreme Court.5 7  The problem, he believed, was caused by the need to
litigate a tax question many times before a conflict develops among the
courts of appeals, thereby providing a basis for Supreme Court review on
certiorari.5 8
152Id. at 158.
53 Supra n.44.
54 Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L REV. 1153 (1944). Pope,
A Court of Tax Appeals: A Call for Re-examination, 39 A.B.A.J. 275 (1953). Del Cotto, The
Need for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 5 (1962).
55 For a general comment on the extent of the debate engendered by the Griswold proposal,
see Tax Notes, 31 A.B.AJ. 376 (1945). For more detailed criticism of the concept of a court
of tax appeals, see Miller, The Courts of Last Resort in Tax Cases: A Specialized Court of Tax
Appeals?, 40 A.B.A.J. 563 (1954), and Miller, Can Tax Appeals be Centralized?, 23 TAXES
303 (1945).
56 Griswold, supra n.54, at 1153.
57 Id. at 1154-55, 1162.
581d. at 1154-55.
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Griswold would give a court of tax appeals exclusive appellate juris-
diction over civil tax cases. 9 The principal basis for' Supreme Court re-
view would be the existence of a constitutional question. On issues of
statutory construction and application and on other questions of tax law,
Griswold would have preferred that the decisions of a court of tax appeals
be final. He believed that this finality would assure the timely settlement
of most tax issues."0 But recognizing that such a limitation would be too
controversial, Griswold proposed instead to allow for Supreme Court re-
view of all such questions on certiorari, trusting to the Supreme Court to
limit its review to a very few cases. 61
Critics of the Griswold proposal took issue with his basic premise by
arguing that the major delays in the tax adjudication process occurred at
the pre-appellate stage, not at the appellate level. 2 They also questioned
the fairness and practicality of asking the Supreme Court to tighten up its
criteria for reviewing tax cases, without doing the same in other areas of
the law. 3 Moreover, the use of specialists in an appellate court met with
disapproval, because it was thought that specialists would be insensitive to
influences outside the tax area which require change in the handling of
particular tax issues. 4 Concern was also expressed that a court appointed
en masse would reflect political considerations to a much greater extent
than a court whose members have been appointed over a period of many
years. " These factors caused the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association to vote its disapproval of the Griswold proposal.00
There is nothing on record to suggest a significant abatement in this
strong opposition to the creation of a court of tax appeals. Nonetheless,
it is a proposal worthy of consideration from time to time, especially
should the demands on the Tax Court and the courts of appeals shift sub-
91d. at 1164. The courts of appeals would retain appellate jurisdiction over criminal tax
cases. Id.
001d. at 1166-67.
10ld. at 1168.
62 Afiller, Last Resort, supra n.55, at 564. Miller, Centralized, supra n.55, at 303.
03 Miller, Last Resort, supra n.55, at 565.
04 Id. at 566. Griswold anticipated such criticism. He believed that the appointment proc-
ess could prevent the selection of narrow, mechanical tax specialists. Moreover, if the court
failed to recognize legitimate pressures for change, the Congress could be expected to legislate
needed changes. Griswold, supra n.52, at 1183. It might also be argued that a court of tax ap-
peals, comprised of tax specialists, would relieve the Supreme Court of the need to handle tax
cases involving statutory interpretation, an area in which the Supreme Court has limited ex-
pertise. At the same time, the Supreme Court's broad concern for civil liberties would probably
guarantee the correction of any oversights by a specialized court of tax appeals involving con-
stitutional protections.
05 Miller, Last Resort, supra n.55, at 567. Miller, Centralized, supra n. 55, at 306. One
possible answer to this problem is suggested by the existence of precedent for appointment in
such circumstances by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from the present judges of the
district courts and the courts of appeal. Pope, supra n.54, at 277. This approach would also,
initially at least, prevent domination of a court of tax appeals by specialists.
6 69 A.B.A. EP. 144 (1945).
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stantially.67 Until the Tax Court can look to a single court of appeals for
precedent, technical justifications will continue to exist for use of the
Lawrence approach. This fact is not sufficient in itself, however, to offset
the many objections to the pronounced alteration in the existing structure
for review of Tax Court decisions that would be caused by the creation of
a court of tax appeals.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Tax Court has made a wise decision in choosing to abandon the
Lawrence approach to the extent that use of that doctrine put the court
in the position of rejecting a court of appeals decision squarely in point
when that court of appeals will review the case. In this most extreme
form of the doctrine's application, the Tax Court only antagonized the
reviewing court and involved the taxpayer in a costly and time-consuming
delay to vindicate what were clearly his rights. Perhaps more importantly,
use of the doctrine did little to further its announced objectives of promot-
ing uniform application of the federal tax laws"' and of speeding Supreme
Court review of tax questions.6 9  Even without using the Lawrence ap-
proach, the Tax Court retains adequate means of communicating its views
-by giving its reasoning in cases appealable to courts whose views on the
particular issue have not been expressed, and by explaining its agreement
or disagreement with the precedent of a court of appeals which the Tax
Court feels constrained to follow.70
The Lawrence doctrine may reappear from time to time in its less ob-
jectionable form, as a means of lifting the Tax Court out of a difficult
situation of judicial administration. Its use may rescue the court from the
illogical position of treating multiple taxpayers involved in the same trans-
action differently because the various litigants can appeal to two or more
courts of appeals who have taken divergent positions on the issue in ques-
tion. The Lawrence doctrine is not likely to re-emerge, however, as a de-
vice for promoting broad objectives of tax policy.
John J. Charles
67 The courts of appeals actually disposed of fewer civil tax cases in 1969 than they did ten
years earlier. In 1969 the courts of appeals handled 349 cases; 190 of them were appealed from
the Tax Court, 159 from district courts. 1969 ANN. REP. OF THE CONM'R OF INT. REV. 121,
table 21. In 1959, 405 cases were disposed of, 284 from the Tax Court and 121 from the district
courts. 1959 ANN. REP. OF THE COMM'R OF INT. REV. 130, table 21.
6 8 ArthurT. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718 (1957).
69 See the discussion of this point under heading III of this article.
70 Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742,757 (1970).
[Vol. 32
